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The paper describes a differential game model of a self- 
managed economy. Workers in self-managed firms control the 
distribution of post-tax enterprise earnings between personal 
consumption and enterprise investment. State agents organize 
public consumption of collective goods (health, education 
etc.) and provide for pensioners and the unemployed, financ­
ing their activities through taxation of enterprise income. 
Noncooperative and cooperative solutions to the game are 
analysed and compared and the model is applied to the case 
of various institutional arrangements adopted in the self- 
managed economy of Yugoslavia in the post-war period.
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Enterprise Investment and Public Consumption 
in a Self-Managed Economy
1. Introduction
The post-1974 institutional framework in Yugoslavia has
been characterised as a mechanism to supplement the operation
of the market by a network of bargaining procedures between
firms, associations of firms, and the state. As Comisso (1980)
has put it: "if the state . . .  is now a legitimate player in
the economic game, industry is to be its partner". In so far
as self-management relations of production internalize the
conflict between labour and capital over the distribution of
the product between current personal consumption and accumulation,
they do so, of themselves, only at the expense of emphasising
the conflict between the worker-collectives' control over
personal consumption and accumulation decisions-on the one
hand, and state control over public consumption on behalf of
those excluded from access to the socialized means of production,
on the other. The institution of self-management planning
developed in Yugoslavia since 1974 can be seen as a mechanism
designed to effectively internalize this fundamental conflict
characterizing a self-managed economy. Comisso's telling
phraseology suggests that this phenomenon can usefully be
modelled through the application of a game theory approach. In
this paper we therefore analyze the evolution of macroeconomic
aggregates in Yugoslavia as a dynamic differential game between
1workers and the state. This approach has already been 
successfully applied to the wage/accumulation conflict of 
capitalism by Lancaster (1973), Hoel (1978) and Pohjoia (1983a, 1985b). 
It has also been applied to the case of a capitalist economy 




























































































extension to the case of a self-managed economy suggests that 
useful across-system comparisons may be available in the future. 
However in the present paper such a comparative analysis is not 
attempted, and the analysis is limited to the analysis of 
differing games played in a self-managed economy.
2. The distribution of the surplus product in Yugoslavia
In a self-managed economy control over the economic decisions 
taken by enterprises resides in principle with the entire 
workforce. Of course, day-to-day management is performed by a 
specialized management staff, but the overall policy on 
investment, hiring and firing, product line and quality, capacity 
utilization, pricing and working conditions lies with the work- 
community. Enterprises operate in a market environment in the 
sense that they are free to buy and sell commodities at a known 
value. Goods markets are thus fairly conventional, and in 
Yugoslavia, for example, one does not observe long queues for 
commodities as is typical of centrally planned economies. On 
the other hand the markets for productive factors, labour and 
capital are only quasi-markets. There is no set price for 
labour, which receives "residual income" depending upon the 
enterprise's market performance, and, since capital is "socially 
owned", there are restrictions over enterprises1 ability to 
manage capital inputs. In Yugoslavia, for example, enterprises 
must maintain in value terms existing capital— there must be no 
net disinvestment. This is all very well for enterprises which 
produce goods for which there is a readily available market.
But for classic public goods (which may be consumed at zero 
marginal, cost) or other goods which may be designated collective 




























































































there may be practical or social obstacles to market provision. 
Practical problems occur in the provision of roads, for example, 
where metering may be prohibitively costly, given the near zero 
marginal cost of consumption. Social obstacles occur in the 
provision of education or health services. Since these services 
enter into the formation of human capital, a certain equality of 
distribution is required whenever the reduction in inequality of 
initial endowments is felt to be important. As Horvat (1976) 
points out, "the rule of distribution according to labour (i.e. 
socialist exchange) can be applied only in situations in which 
the basic requirement of equality of opportunity is not 
jeopardized" (p. 122) . The public sector therefore operates 
according to the principle of "distribution according to needs". 
This must also be the case for those among the population who 
are excluded access from socially owned capital, i.e. the 
unemployed and pensioners. All of this implies a continuing 
role for the state in a self-managed economy as some non-market 
forms of financing and distribution of public consumption must 
be arranged. It is not surprising therefore that in the 
evolution of the self-management economy in Yugoslavia a large 
part of the story has been played out by changing relations 
between the enterprises and the state. In particular, the 
changing nature of the control over and distribution of the 
surplus above material costs has been a central focus of the 
various economic reforms which have been undertaken in the post­
war period.
Initially the self-management system was little more than 
an arrangement whereby workers were granted limited rights of 
participation in exchange for the acceptance of tight controls 
over the level of real wages (Bartlett, 1980). The enterprise 




























































































centrally through the investment planning system which remained 
in force until 1957, and labour payments were made on the basis 
of a fixed wage with a variable profit sharing supplement. That 
part of profits not "shared" with the workers was appropriated 
by the state budget. However, in. 1957, at the first Congress of 
Workers Councils, demands for greater freedom in enterprise 
income distribution were heard. As Lydall (1984) notes, "workers 
and managers in prosperous enterprises were getting tired of 
surrendering so much of the income of their enterprises to the 
government". In 1958, therefore, in a mini-reform, the 
principle of distribution was changed from profit-sharing to 
income sharing, by which no fixed wage payment was made, and the 
distinction between fixed and variable wages was abolished. The 
enterprises were, in principle, free to distribute net post-tax 
income between personal incomes and enterprise funds. The 
profits tax was replaced by a 15% tax on net income ("dohodak").
However, at this stage, only the "micro-level" aspects of 
self-management were in full operation, that is to say the 
enterprise could be characterised as one whose objective would 
be to maximize income per employee. (And in fact it was just at 
this point that the original income-per-head maximizing model by 
Ward appeared in the American Economic Review.) The enterprise 
still did not have full control over investment decisions, which 
were influenced also by the various agencies which were 
responsible for formulating the "Social Plan" and distributing 
investment funds (the General Investment Fund at the federal 
level and the Social Investment Funds at the republican level). 
Changes in the distribution of the investment funds among the 
various agencies depended largely on changes in the tax laws, 




























































































Table 1. Investment in Fixed Assets by Source of Funds (%)
1952 1955 1960 19 62 1964
State 98 64 62 59 36
Enterprises 2 35 37 38 32
Banks — 1 1 3 32
Source; World Bank (1975).
According to the OECD report of 1962, "in view of the 
Yugoslav authorities, the policy of centralization of part of 
the incomes of enterprises and workers in social funds helps to 
redistribute and channel the use of available national resources 
in a socially desirable manner" (p. 22). In general enterprises 
could find themselves in a position of being unable to complete 
their own plans if these were in conflict with the federal plan 
and the plans of other "socio-political communities" (i.e. 
republican and local government authorities). In enterprises 
where the federal plan was not being fulfilled, the federal 
planning authorities could overrule the enterprise plan. Even 
in normal circumstances the federal "social planning" agencies 
had powers to instruct enterprises and industries in aspects of 
capital formation and utilization.^ So in general throughout 
this period the limits of decentralization of control over 
investment policy and the distribution of surplus product were 
closely circumscribed. This enabled the proportions in which, 
investment resources were distributed between the various 
sectors of economic activity to be closely regulated by the 
plan.
But reform was in the air. In 1964 the 5th Congress of the 



























































































retention by enterprises and greater enterprise control over 
investment policy" (Lydall, 1984, p. 81). In 1963 the General 
Investment Fund was abandoned and its resources handed over to 
specialized investment banks and the dismantling of the Social 
Investment Funds of the republics in 1964 called an end to the 
system of investment planning. The full complement of reforms 
carried out in 1965 ensured that enterprises themselves had 
full freedom to make decisions over the allocation of their 
own investment funds. The allocation of net income between 
the "Business Fund" (i.e. accumulation)and the "Personal 
Income Fund" (out of which wages were paid) was put fully at 
the discretion of the enterprise and its workers council. The 
director of the enterprise was now elected by the workers 
council, and all rules and regulations imposed from outside 
the enterprise which had existed previously were rescinded. A 
flat 25-30% tax was imposed on the personal incomes fund and 
was levied by the commune. A capital tax was retained (to be 
abolished in 1970) and the multiple tier turnover tax was 
replaced by a single tier sales tax. All other taxes on the 
enterprises were abolished (EanSekovid, 1973). The object was 
to leave a greater proportion of net income at the disposal of 
the enterprise, with a smaller part taken by taxes. Thus the 
1965 reforms are often taken to have introduced a period of 
maximal self-management, in which the enterprises themselves 
had unconstrained freedom to make decisions regarding the rate 
of investment in addition to setting prices, wage levels and 
levels of employment. At this stage both the "micro" and 
"macro" aspects of self-management were operational.
However, the public sector was left out of this progression 
towards decentralized self-management. Health, education and 




























































































the state budget. In order to extend self-management relations
into this sector a further round of reforms was carried out in
the mid 1970's. The object of these reforms was to integrate
the provision of social service (collective consumption) into
the economic decision-making framework of the self-managing 
4enterprises. The formal framework was set out in the new 
Constitution of 1974. The new system was based upon the formation 
of self-managed communities of interest (samoupravne interesne 
zajednice - SIZovi) which would act as a link between enterprises 
who financed the services and the service organizations 
themselves, and were a type of bargaining instrument to determine 
the allocation of resources to public consumption. In the 
SIZovi, delegates from the enterprises in a locality and from 
the local social service organizations would determine the tax 
rates (contributions) to be levied, and the level of service to 
be provided, in principle quite independently of state control.5 
Contributions ("doprinosi") fall typically on personal incomes.6 
Pejovich (1979) reports an average contribution rate to the 
health sector of 8-9%. In this way the SIZovi channel some 60% 
of public consumption, i.e. the so-called "collective needs" 
(zajedni£ke potrebe) for education, health, child welfare, social 
welfare, etc. The other 40% of expenditure is accounted for by 
state agencies, for "general social needs" (opstedrustvene 
potrebe), i.e. for the finance of the budgets of the "socio­
political communities". This covers the expenses of state 
agencies and institutions, defense expenditure, and the fund 
for regional development, and is financed directly by taxation 
("porez"). The significance of the new system of social 
planning of public consumption, which is referred to as the 
"free exchange of labour" (i.e. the exchange of finance from 




























































































enterprises) is the joint bargaining element which is introduced 
into the determination of the allocation of the enterprise sur­
plus between wage payments, enterprise investment allocations, 
and contributions for public consumption. In this bargaining 
situation productive enterprises and the suppliers of social 
services can, together, come to an agreement about the current 
distribution of social resources between current private con­
sumption, current public consumption, and current investment 
which will increase resources for future distribution. This 
"cooperative game" approach to the distribution of the national
product characterises the system of self-management which the
7Yugoslavs attempted to develop in the post-1974 period. At 
least, this is the principle. In practice things may be rather 
different. Typically contribution rates are uniform across 
SIZovi, which suggests the continued influence of the state in 
the finance and organization of collective consumption. Sefer 
observes that "in relation to such an overall concept of the 
role of /public/ consumption in economic development and the 
forms of financing it, practice to date has been seriously lag­
ging. . . Financial relations between the economy and the 
social services, although institutionally organized on a self­
management basis (through self-management communities of interest) 
continue to be characterised by fiscal sources of financing 
social consumption, and less so through the free exchange of 
labour" (p. 272).
Clearly, the mere formal institutional framework does not 
always tell us a great deal about the reality of allocation and 
distribution mechanisms operating in any actual economy, and 
Sefer may well be right in his observations on the divergence of 
practice from theory-. In order to get a grip on the likely 
effects of the operation (or non-operation) of the formal 




























































































section which describes the distribution process between private 
consumption, public consumption and enterprise investment as a 
differential game between the workers and the state. The model 
is derivative of the work of Lancaster (1973), Hoel (1978) and 
Pohjola (1983a) who analyse capitalism as a game between workers 
and capitalists and Pohjola (1983b) who analyses a capitalist 
economy with workers' investment funds. Both noncooperative 
(Cournot-Nash) behaviour (characterising the formal institutional 
framework of the post-1965 period) and cooperative (joint 
decision) behaviour of the post-1974 "free exchange of labour" 
period are analysed.
3. A differential game model of a self-managed economy
In this section we model a stylized self-managed economy 
which contains two separate groups of decision makers, workers 
and state agents. Workers, organized in self-managed firms, 
make decisions over the distribution of the net product between 
personal consumption and investment and on employment levels; 
state agents make decisions on tax rates and hence upon the 
current level of provision of public consumption.
The game-theoretic element is the following. Given 
current tax rates, the workers may decide to undertake some 
savings (and corresponding investment) by reducing current 
consumption, in order to provide for a higher level of future 
consumption. But they have no guarantee that the state will not 
appropriate the future proceeds of their current sacrifice by 
raising tax rates in the future. On the other hand, the state 
may tax enterprises heavily to increase current public 
consumption, but if they do so, it diminishes the resources 




























































































base. However, should the state decide to tax relatively lightly 
in the current period, it has no guarantee that the workers 
actually will undertake the level of investment it would wish.
If it follows this strategy it may only be to see its worst fears 
fulfilled, that the workers will consume the surplus. The 
associated noncooperative game equilibrium strategies of workers 
and state are developed in this section. Later on we consider 
the cooperative strategies which characterise the use of 
negotiation, social compacts and free exchange of labour under 
self-management planning. A key difference between the present 
model and those of the capitalist economy is that here decisions 
over saving and investment are undertaken by the same group of
gagents, the workers. Problems arise in the self-managed economy 
on the contrary because of the separation of decisions over 
private and public consumption.
Self-managed firms use inputs of capital (K) and labour (L)
to produce output according to the production function F(K,L).
Output per worker is y = F(K,L)/L. Enterprises are assumed to
maximize net consumption per head over a horizon T, by.choice of
9savings rate s, given r the level of employment L, a sales tax 
rate Zp (porez), and an income tax rate z  ̂ (doprinosi); i.e. to 
maximize the functional:
max = /q (1 — zx) (1 — z2) (l-s)ydt
subject to a capital accumulation constraint
K = (1-Zj) syL





























































































L = LQent where n = 0.
In addition, initial conditions are given by 
K(0) = KQ
and the control region is given by
0 < s < s(z^), s' < 0, i = 1,2.
The maximum rate of savings is given by the minimum level of 
consumption per head. Clearly, the higher the rate of taxation, 
the lower the maximum rate of savings compatible with a given 
minimum level of consumption per head. The associated Hamiltonian 
function is given by:
H1 = (l-z1)(l-z2) (l-s)y +  ̂1 (1-zx) syL
where \p, is the adjoint variable representing the current valuation 
of investment, by worker-managers, in terms of consumption.
Correspondingly, the state is assumed to maximize the 
collective consumption of entire population including the un­
employed, pensioners,; and other non-participants in the production 
process, by varying the tax rates; i.e. to maximize the functional:
max J ? = /q[ z 1v + z 2 (1 —z]l) (1 —s)y] (L/N)dt 
z -l
where N is the size of the population, which again, without loss 




























































































subject to the capital accumulation constraint 
K = (1-z) syL
and is bound by the initial condition 
K (0) = KQ
and the control regions 
0 < < a
0 < ^ b.
We assume there are upper bounds, a and b, to the politicaly 
feasible tax rates, each strictly less than 1/2, which are 
determined by historical and cultural factors, independently 
of the game process, and which, if they do change, change only 
very slowly. Note that it is only the enterprises which under­
take investment. The Halmiltonian relevant to the state's 
problem is:
H2 " I Zl + Z2 ̂ 1-zî  (1_s) 1 + 1 ^ 2  d ~ zi) svL
where \p2 is the adjoint variable representing the current 
valuation, by the state, of investment in terms of consumption. 
Each player chooses his strategy on {s} or {2 ^ 2 2 } so as 
to maximize the relevant Hamiltonian subject to the capita,l 
accumulation constraint on K. Only open-loop strategies are 
considered so that no use is made of additional information 




























































































solving the non-cooperative version of this non-zero sum 
differential game.1^
Necessary conditions to solve the game are: 
dip. 3H.--- ------ ; Tp. (T) = 0
3t 9K
and H; is maximized by choice of the relevant control variable.
• •Clearly ip < 0, ip~ < 0 for F > 0, Thus, so long as the1 Z J\
marginal product of capital is not driven below zero, the shadow 
price of investment will be falling over the time horizon.11
Moreover,
9 1 ^ / 9 3  = ( l - z 1 ) y[  i J^L-  ( l - z 2 ) ] ^  0 
(i-z2)
as ijj. ------  .
L
In addition
1-z (It s )
3Hp/9z h vL[---------t ip s] ^ 0
N
(l-z?) + z 2 s
as ip? ^  ---- :-------
sN
and 9h2/9z2 = (1-21 } (1-3} >  °
c c c
Clearly \p^ > where \ p ^ is the critical switching value
of the shadow price of investment for the respective player. 





























































































s = s (0,b), Z1 = o, z2 = b for t G [ 0,f)
s = s (a, b) , Z1 = a, z2 = b for t G (f ,t")
s = 0 t Z1 = a, z2 = b for t G (t",t].
Thus there are three distinct phases. The workers initially 
save and invest at the maximum rate while the state initially 
refrains from imposing a sales tax. in the middle phase, the state 
imposes sales taxation, but the enterprises continue to save and 
invest since the shadow price of investment, in terms of their 
own consumption is still above its critical value. However, the 
rate of savings falls in compensation for the reduction in net 
revenue. In the final phase,enterprise savings and investment falls 
to zero and private and public consumption take place at the 
maximum rates. The state imposes income taxation throughout.
The cooperative solution can be found by taking a weighted 
average of the two functionals. The self-management planning 
mechanism, as a device for ensuring cooperative play, thus 
involves maximizing the joint functional:
max J3 - /q{X 1 (l-z1) (l-z2) (l-s)y
s,zx,z2
+ X9[ z1+z2 (l-z1) (1-s) ] v |}dt
13where X , X2 a,re bargaining weights with X3 + X2 = 1.
The associated Hamiltonian is:
H3 - { • } + ip3 ( l^ -z1 ) syL
and the switch point is found by differentiation with respect to s





























































































so that the switch point for s is given by: 
X, (l-z0) + X2z2(L/N)
* 3 56
Comparing the cooperative and non cooperative solution gives
*3 ® »!








it follows that the critical value of \p relevant to savings 
decisions in the cooperative game is lower than that in the 
non-cooperative game. Consequently we may expect the final 
reduction in savings and investment to be delayed in the 
former case.
The conclusion of the analysis, therefore, is that we 
expect positive saving to continue for longer under conditions 
of joint decision making over the distribution of the surplus 
product. The intuitive reason is that under joint decision­
making arrangements, enterprises take into account not only 
their own consumption profiles but also the profile of public 




























































































game, the shadow value of investment falls to its critical 
value, before it falls to the critical level as valued by 
the society as a whole. Thus although it would be socially 
optimal for enterprises to continue to invest, under non- 
cooperative arrangements, where they only consider their 
own interest, they will not do so.
This suggests a possible hypothesis for the behaviour of 
distribution in Yugoslavia, namely that if the rules of the 
game were genuinely changed from a non-cooperative to cooperative 
scheme following the institution of self-management planning in 
1974, we would expect a rise in investment relative to public 
consumption in the years immediately following the change, to 
reflect the greater willingness of enterprises to undertake 
investment in the face of positive rates of taxation.
This would be followed by a subsequent fall in investment 





























































































Yugoslav statistical data are calculated according to the 
MPS (material product system). Unlike the United Nations SNA 
(system of national accounts) methodology, no direct account of 
"non-material" or "unproductive" activities is included in the 
calculation of Social Product. However, separate accounts of 
the unproductive sector are produced, and both the OECD and a 
study by Krejii (1982) have shown how figures for GDP at market 
prices may be extracted from the Yugoslav statistics. A series 
approximating the notion of "government final consumption 
expenditure" can also be constructed, which reflects the actual 
end use of resources in the social service sector. It is 
constructed by adding together a series for wages and salaries 
paid to workers in the sphere of collective consumption, general 
social consumption, and banks and insurance companies and a 
series for intermediate consumption of goods and services by 
these organizations (OECD, 1983). The following table compares 
the resulting series with one for GDP at market prices, 
government final consumption expenditure of the EEC, and gross 




























































































Table 2. Aggregates as a % of GDP at market prices
(1) (2) (3->












1967 17.0 15.4 25.6 66.4 53.5
1968 17.7 15.2 27.0 65.5 53.3
1969 17.0 15.1 26.9 63.2 52.3
1 970 16.8 15.2 28.4 59.2 52.5
1971 15.6 16.0 27.5 56.7 51.7
1972 16.0 16.2 26.2 61.1 53.6
1973 14.9 16.2 r 24.1 61 .8 52.9
1974 15.7 17.2 24.8 63.3 51 .6
1975 17.0 18.2 28.3 60.1 51 .1
1976 17.4 17.9 30.2 57.6 51.5
1977 17.7 17.8 32.1 55.1 51.4
1978 17.4 17.9 35.1 49.6 51.9
1979 17.6 18.0 34.6 51 .0 51.9
1980 16.9 18.6 31.7 53.3 51.1
1981 15.8 19.3 28.4 55.6 50.9
Sources : OECD "Economic Survey of Yugoslavia", June 1983, Table
B; May 1980, Table B; OECD "Economic Outlook" 1984.
Private consumption was a rather stable
proportion of GD P over the per iod, falling
slightly from 53.5% in 1967 to 50 .9% in 1981 , but never departing
from that range. On the contrary , large swings are observed in
the series for the share of gross fixed capital formation, which
rose from 24.1% in 1973 to 35.1% in 1978. Public expenditure




























































































points above its 1973 levels. It is remarkable that although 
slightly less stable, the share of "government final expenditure" 
in GDP in Yugoslavia was broadly similar to that in the EEC 
countries. The impact of 30 years of supposed "de-etatisation" 
does not seem to have had a great effect upon the allocation of 
the share of resources to final public consumption.
Despite the slight rise in the share of this aggregate 
between 1973 and 1978, the overall ratio between government final 
consumption and gross fixed capital formation, reported in column 
5, declined sharply from an index of 61.8 to one of 49.6. This 
could clearly be interpreted to support an argument that the new 
system of self-management planning did indeed have the effect of 
bringing together the two opposing interests of private and 
public consumption in a joint decision-making framework, and was 
not merely a smokescreen for the continuation of the bad old 
alienated ways of the previous constitution as suggested by 
Sefer. However, if this was indeed the case, then it must also 
be noted that the system was supported by running a continuous 
balance of payments deficit over the period, of increasing both 
public and private consumption, rather than of making realistic 
trade-offs between the two, and storing up problems for the 
future. Indeed by 1980 the Yugoslav economy was plunged into a 
serious economic crisis as its external debts mounted to 
insupportable levels. Average annual growth of GDP of 6.1% 
between 1973 and 1978, well in excess of that for the EEC 
countries (Germany 2.4%, Italy 3.2%) was made possible by the 
investment boom. However, real gross social product rose by only 
2.2% in 1980, 1.4% in 1981, 0.7% in 1982 and fell by 1.3% in 1983 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1984, 4). A stabilization 




























































































aggressive devaluation of the dinar, price inflation approaching 
60% in 1984, and falls in the level of consumer expenditure (1% 
in 1981, 0.1% in 1982 and 0.1% in 1983), public consumption 
(0.7% in 1981, 1.6% in 1982 and 1.5% in 1983) and enterprise 
investment (9.3% in 1981, 5.5% in 1982 and 5.5% in 1983). Real 
wages are reported to have fallen by some 25% between 1979 and 
1983 and by a further 10% in 1984 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1984, 4) .
5. Conclusion
The Yugoslav experience in the post-1974 period can be 
interpreted in differing ways. Rising investment shares in an 
initial stage (as the game framework switches from a noncooperative 
regime to a cooperative regime) followed by falling investment 
shares (as the switching value of ip is reached) are predicted by 
the model. Such a strategy may be considered Pareto optimal if 
it reflects a socially agreed choice to postpone an immediate 
increase of current consumption for the sake of higher future, levels of 
both private and public consumption. However, if the economy's 
external budget constraint is not respected and a social choice 
is made for higher shares of both investment and consumption 
simultaneously, then it may be thought that the design of the 
bargaining mechanism contains inherent defects. More favourably, 
Yugoslavia's current crisis could be viewed as a representative 
example of the difficulties experienced by a number of small 
outward-oriented newly-industrializing countries of the European 
periphery (Greece, Spain, Portugal) faced by a dramatic deterioration 




























































































1. For a useful survey of the application of this branch of game 
theory to economic problems see Clemhout and Wan (1979).
2. For a more extensive treatment of arguments for collective 
provision of public goods see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
3. In addition to implementing the general distribution of 
investment resources in conformity with the social plans on a 
republic and sectoral level, the banks which implemented the 
funds also took various financial indicators into account 
when allocating funds between projects. The types of criteria 
applied on a project level included the share of capital 
which the enterprise itself was prepared to contribute to the 
project, the balance of payments effect, and the "contribution 
to output" which the project would make, a type of capital- 
output criteria.
4. "If social services were financed and organized through the 
state, a growing proportion of workers' income would be 
alienated, the social service workers would be mere 
employees", Sefer (1982), p. 266-7.
5. For a more detailed account of these arrangements see 
Bartlett (1985).
6. Some 70% of contributions are levied on personal incomes 
whilst only 30% are levied on "enterprise income" (i.e. prior 
to the distribution of income to the business and personal 





























































































7. " . . .  the socio-political significance of free exchange of 
labour is its ability to create conditions in which workers 
(both in the sphere of material production and in social 
services) can jointly determine the conditions in which they 
work and dispose of the results of their labour"; Jurkovic 
(1982), p. 220. Emphasis added.
8. " . . .  the welfare loss from capitalism is due to the game- 
type situation which arises from the separation of the 
consumption decision from the investment decision. In this 
sense, the weakness of capitalism is of a Keynesian, rather 
than a Marxian, kind"; Lancaster (1973), p. 1106.
r
9. It is assumed that employment is chosen exoaenously to the 
enterprise in Yugoslavia, e.g. by the self-management 
planning agreements with the local and republican state organs.
10. See Clembout and Wan (1979) or Ho and Olsder (1983).
11. It is assumed that capital is sufficiently productive that 
this condition holds.
V
12. In fact the bang-bang nature of the solution would be 
smoothed if the Hamiltonians were non-linear in the 
controls. This would occur if the objective functionals were 
set up in utility terms.
A standard theorem in game theory ensures that this will 
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